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Insider

trading

cases,

which

are

typically

prosecuted as securities fraud, carry a mystique rarely

present in securities litigation. As a former U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of New York once observed, the
cases involve "'basically cops and robbers.... [d]id you get
the information and did you trade on it?"1 It is no wonder

that

each

insider

trading

case

featured

in

this

symposium presents a captivating story. But for two

distinct reasons, Chiarella v. United States2 occupies a
special place in history. It was the first prosecution under
the federal securities laws for the crime of insider
trading. And the U.S. Supreme Court's iconic holdingregarding the circumstances under which insider trading
constitutes securities fraud-not only profoundly
changed the law in 1980 but also continues to define
insider trading's contours right up to the present day.
Chiarella's facts are
straightforward
and
memorable. The defendant was employed by a financial
printing firm hired to publish announcements of takeover
bids. On several occasions he managed to deduce from
code names the identities of the actual companies, and
1 Stephen Labaton and David Leonhardt, Whispers Inside.
Thunder Outside, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2002 at C1 (quoting
Otto Obermaier, former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
of New York).

2 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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then used that confidential information to surreptitiously
purchase stock in the acquisition targets. 3 After settling
a civil securities fraud action brought by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, Chiarella was indicted in
New York federal court for criminal securities fraud,
found guilty by a jury, and unsuccessfully appealed to the
Second Circuit. The Supreme Court, however, overturned
his conviction. 4
While the case is famous, important aspects of
Chiarella have gone unnoticed or been long since
forgotten. This essay sets out to explore these aspects in
order to better understand how a seemingly mundane
SEC settlement involving just over $30,000 in ill-gotten

gains morphed into a groundbreaking insider trading
prosecution and Supreme Court decision. The exploration
draws from a close analysis of the civil and criminal
litigation record as well as interviews with most of the
principal attorneys involved in the case at its various
stages, all of whom went on to extraordinary careers in
public service, private practice, or law teaching (with
many toggling between two or all three). This
distinguished cadre includes: Stanley S. Arkin, Judge
Frank H. Easterbrook, Ralph C. Ferrara, Robert B.
Fiske, Jr., Paul Gonson, Professor Donald C. Langevoort,

Judge Jed S. Rakoff, Lee S. Richards III, John S. Siffert,
and John "Rusty" Wing, and extends as well to their
remembrances of Stephen Shapiro.
Insider

trading law

in the U.S. is routinely

depicted as "judge-made" or "judicially created." 5 The
3 Id. at 224.
4
Id. at 225.

5 See, e.g., Tom McParland, Judicial Inconsistency Frustrates
Purposes of Insider Trading Law, Rakoff Says, Law.com (Feb.
28, 2020), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/02/28
/judicial-inconsistency-frustrates-purpose-of-insider-tradinglaw-rakoff-says/ (quoting Judge Jed Rakoffs observation that
the insider trading prohibition has "really been judge-made
law, almost from the very outset").
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description is apposite. Although Congress statutorily
authorized the SEC rule prohibiting "fraud in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security," it is courts that
must determine, as a matter of federal common law,
whether securities trading on the basis of material
nonpublic information constitutes a "deceptive device or
contrivance" under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 6 and thus a "fraud"
within Rule 10b-5's prohibition.7 But the description also
leaves unacknowledged the essential role of the SEC,
DOJ, and defense attorneys in framing the arguments on
which the judicial rulings are based.
Nowhere
have
attorneys
influenced
the
development of insider trading law more profoundly than
in the various phases of the Chiarella litigation. This
story therefore suggests, with no hint of exaggeration,
that Chiarella's indelible impact results as much from
the case's lawyering as from the ruling announced by the
Court in its landmark decision.
A. The Path to the First Criminal Conviction
for Insider Trading

1. Pandick Press, Vincent Chiarella, and the
SEC Settlement
Pandick Press, Inc., located in New York City,
regularly provided printing services to corporations and

their legal and financial advisers. On multiple occasions
in 1975 and 1976, law firms and investments banks for
acquiring companies hired the printer to publish
announcements relating to impending takeovers.
Pandick adhered to standard industry protocol by using
code names to identify both its acquisition-company

6 15 U.S.C. 78j(b).
7

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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customer and the target company up until the night of
the final printing. 8

Vincent Chiarella, who was 47 years old at the
time, had moved his way up to the position of "mark-up
man" during his more than two decades of employment
at Pandick. 9 He was also, as it turns out, an avid stock
trader, who regularly spoke with his securities broker. In
connection with his work on a mark-up assignment in
September 1975 and four such assignments in 1976,
Chiarella managed to decipher the identity of the actual
companies involved in upcoming transactions, based on
other facts provided in the takeover materials.1 0 He then
secretly used that confidential information to purchase
stock in the acquisition targets, and within days or
sometimes even hours after his stock purchases, the
acquiring companies made their public announcement.
On each occasion the target stock's price rose sharply,
and each time Chiarella sold his shares immediately.
Chiarella's sizable profits were possible only because
several of his purchases were for substantial amounts of
target stock. His stock purchases in two of the targets, for
example, amounted to approximately one-half of each
stock's total daily trading volume.1 1 Those large volume
purchases on the cusp of takeover announcements caught
the attention of the New York Stock Exchange, which
referred the suspicious activity to the SEC. 12
The SEC opened an investigation into Chiarella's
trading activities in early 1977, and instituted a civil

8 United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978).
9 Brief for Respondent at 4, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (1979) (No. 78-1202) (hereinafter Chiarella Government
Brief).
10
Id. at 7.
1 See id. at 9 (citing Trial Transcript).

12 SEC v. Chiarella, Lit. Rel. No. 79357, 1977 SEC Lexis 1674
(May 24, 1977) (hereinafter ChiarellaLit. Rel.).
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enforcement action in the SDNY a few months later. 13
The complaint charged Chiarella with violating
Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by purchasing
shares in three tender offer targets (Sprague Electronic
Company; Booth Newspapers,

Inc.; and Food Town

Stores, Inc.) and a fourth company, Riviana Foods, that
had been the target of a merger. 14 The complaint further
alleged that Chiarella made these stock purchases
"without disclosing the material, non-public information
he had obtained in connection with his employment," 15
and thus engaged in a "deceit upon the purchasers and
sellers of such securities," 16 resulting in a combined profit
of $29,248.17

13

See Complaint, Civ. Action 77-2534, SEC v. Chiarella (filed

May 16, 1977, SDNY, Goettel, J.) The complaint, obtained from

the SEC through a request under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA), is now available in the SEC Historical Society's
Virtual Museum and Archive, at http://www.sechistorical.

org/collection/papers/1970/1977_0516_ChiarellaComplaint_S
DNY.pdf.
14 See ChiarellaSEC Complaint, supra note 13, at ¶¶ 13, 19,
25, 30. In connection with Chiarella's stock purchases in
tender-offer targets, the SEC also charged him with violating
Exchange Act Section 14(e), a general provision prohibiting

fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative practices in connection
with tender offers. More than three years later, the SEC
adopted a tender-offer specific insider trading prohibition. See
infra note 132 (discussing SEC Rule 14e-3).
15 ChiarellaSEC Complaint, supra note 13, ¶¶ 13, 19, 25, 30.
16
Id. at ¶ 9.
17 Id. at ¶¶ 15, 21, 27, 32. Irwin Borowski, Richard S. Kraut,
and Peter M. Sullivan were the attorneys who worked on the
Chiarella matter in the SEC's main (Washington, D.C.) office,
and William D. Moran was the NY Office's Regional
Administrator. See Docket Sheet, SEC v. Chiarella, 77 Civ.
2534 (SDNY, Goettel, J.), available at http://www.sechistorical

.org/collection/papers/1970/1977_0523_SDNYDocketSheet.p
df.
[11]
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The SEC announced a settlement with Chiarella
on the same day it filed the complaint against him, 18 but
that disposition was only for purposes of the SEC's civil
enforcement authority. 19 Without admitting or denying
the SEC's charges against him, Chiarella consented to
the issuance of a federal court order enjoining him from
future securities law violations and agreed to disgorge his
trading profits to the shareholders who had sold him
target stock.20 At the time, such injunctive and ancillary
equitable remedies were the only relief available to the
SEC in a civil insider trading case. 21 Congress had yet to
enact the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, which
authorizes the SEC to seek court-ordered penalties of up
to three times the profit made or loss avoided by an
insider trading defendant. 22 Pandick Press also
administered a punishment of its own: the company fired
Chiarella from his position the very same day that the
SEC announced the settlement.

18 See ChiarellaLit. Rel., supra note 12. See also S.E.C. Says
Typesetter Improperly Used Data, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1977 at

61.
19 See id. See also 17 C.F.R. §202.5(f) (stating the SEC policy
"that settlements of any civil enforcement matter may not,
expressly or impliedly, extend to any criminal charges that
have been, or may be, brought against any such person or any
recommendation with respect thereto" and observing that
criminal proceedings may be instituted only by "the Attorney
General and representatives of the Department of Justice").
20 ChiarellaLit. Rel., supra note 12.
21 See ChiarellaSEC Complaint, supranote 13, at I-IV.
22 Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 § 2A, Pub. L. No. 98376, 98 Stat. 1264 (subsequently amended and re-codified at
Exchange Act § 21A(a), 15 U.S.C. 78u-1(a)).

[12]
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Chiarella was hardly the first worker at a
financial printing firm who found himself under SEC
scrutiny. In 1974, the SEC filed a complaint, which it
ultimately settled, against three employees at Sorg
Printing Company, Inc., who had likewise engaged in
securities trading based on confidential takeover
information. 23 As the Second Circuit emphasized, the
SEC settlement decree in Sorg "aroused widespread
concern in the financial printing industry" and prompted
most printers (including Pandick) to post signs in the
workplace forbidding employees "to use any information
learned from a customer's copy." 24 The signs' warnings,
which also were included as notices on the back of timeclock punch-cards and in union newspapers, advised
workers that misuse of such information could render
them liable for "criminal penalties of 5 years in jail and
$10,000 for each offense." 25 In between its enforcement
actions against the Sorg employees and Chiarella, the
SEC filed at least three other actions against printer
workers, and obtained consent decrees imposing
injunctive and disgorgement remedies. 26 As the Wall
Street Journal and New York Times did on those prior
occasions, 27 the newspapers reported on Chiarella's SEC
settlement. 28

23

See SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., Lit. Rel. No. 6488, 1974 SEC

Lexis 2778 (Aug. 21, 1974) (announcing complaint). See also

SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep ¶ 95,034, 1975 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 13121 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (observing that the three
employees "have consented to the entry of a preliminary
injunction," but granting the printing company's motion for

summary judgment because it was neither "an aider or abettor"
nor "secondarily liable on a theory of respondeat superior").
24 Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1369.
25 Id. (quoting workplace signs at Pandick Press).
26

See id. (citing SEC v. Primar Typographers, Inc., Fed Sec L.

Rep. ¶ 95,734 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Ayoub, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
¶ 95,567 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)). See also SEC v. Smith et al., Lit.
Release No. 7420, 1976 SEC Lexis 1539 (June 1, 1976)

[13]
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2. The Criminal Indictment

On January 4, 1978, less than eight months after
the settlement of the SEC's civil case, the U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of New York indicted Chiarella
on 17 counts of willful and knowing misuse of material,
nonpublic information in violation of Exchange Act §10(b)
and Rule lOb-5, 29 pursuant to the criminal liability
provision in Exchange Act § 32(a).30 Counts 3 through 17
of the indictment roughly tracked the SEC complaint's
allegations concerning Chiarella's purchases of shares in
Riviana, Food Town, Booth, and Sprague. 31 Counts 1 and
2 raised new allegations charging Chiarella with
unlawful purchases in the stock of USM Corporation,
generating an additional $1019 in profits. 32

John S. Siffert was the Assistant U.S. Attorney
who successfully tried the case to a jury and argued in
the Second Circuit on appeal. Siffert reported to John
(announcing consent order against three employees of Bowne
& Co.).
27 See, e.g., SEC Charges 3 Employees of Bowne & Co., A
Printer, With Trading on Insider Data, WALL ST. J., May 25,
1976 at 12; SEC Charges 2 Brokers, Printer Violated InsiderTrading Rules in Unitek Shares, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1976 at
5 (reporting on complaint filed in Ayoud et al.); Felix Belair,
Jr., S.E.C. ChargesMisuse of Data, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1974
at 53 (reporting on Song employees complaint).
28

PrintingEmployee Charged With Gainingfrom Tender Offer
Bid, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1977 at 8; S.E.C. Says Typesetter
Improperly Used Data, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1977 at 61.
29 See Arnold Lubasch, Printeris Indicted on Charges of Using
Inside Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1978 at D5.
30 15 U.S.C. 78ff.
31 See Indictment, United States v. Chiarella, No. 78 Cr. 2
(S.D.N.Y., Jan. 4,
1978, Owen,
J.), available
at

http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1970/1978_0101
_Chiarella_Indictment_SDNY.pdf.
32 Id.

[14]
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"Rusty" Wing, the Chief of the Securities and Business
Fraud Unit, and Robert B. Fiske, Jr., the U.S. Attorney.
As Siffert's preparation for Chiarella's trial was
underway, Wing left the SDNY to join the firm of Weil,
Gotshal, and Jed Rakoff succeeded Wing as the Fraud
Unit Chief. Siffert was not, however, the AUSA who
worked with the grand jury. Rather, Siffert took over the
case from John A. Lowe, who left the SDNY for private
practice a few weeks after Chiarella's indictment. 33 It
may have been the press reports about the SEC
settlement that caught Lowe's attention and prompted
the criminal investigation. 34

Then-U.S. Attorney Fiske, now a senior counsel
and retired partner at the Davis Polk law firm,
remembers well the SDNY Office's rationale for
instituting a criminal insider trading prosecution against

Chiarella.

Fiske,

who

describes his U.S. Attorney

33 Telephone interview with John S. Siffert, Co-Founding
Partner, Lankler Siffert Wohl (Sept. 6, 2019).
34 See Roundtable on Enforcement at 104, SEC HISTORICAL
SOCIETY (Sept. 25, 2002), http://www.sechistorical.org/
collection/programs/enforcementTranscript.pdf

(statement by

former SEC Solicitor Paul Gonson suggesting that an AUSA
"had read about the settlement in the newspaper . . . and
indicted Mr. Chiarella for the action the SEC had settled"). But
see JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT FAILS TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES 77 (2017) (book

passage attributing the origins of Chiarella's criminal
prosecution to a telephone referral from SEC Enforcement
Director Stanley Sporkin to Jed Rakoff). It is unlikely that the
criminal case arose from Sporkin's encouragement. Jed Rakoff,
who became Chief of the SDNY's Securities and Business
Fraud Unit after the preparation for Chiraella's criminal trial
had already begun, was not involved in the indictment
decision. Interview with the Honorable Jed Rakoff, SDNY
District Judge (Oct. 30, 2019). And neither Robert Fiske nor
Rusty Wing recalls Sporkin referring the matter to them.
Telephone interview with Robert B. Fiske, Jr., Senior Counsel,
Davis Polk & Wardwell (Oct. 28, 2019); Siffert Telephone
interview, supra note 33.

[15]
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leadership as "hands-on," 35 had been aware of the prior
SEC enforcement actions against workers in the printing
industry. He attributed the reoccurring illegality to the
inadequacy of existing civil remedies - injunctions and
disgorgement were simply not serving as deterrents that

outweighed the temptation faced by some workers to
convert customer information into personal trading
profits.3 6 Fiske was also cognizant of the efforts
undertaken by the financial printing industry to educate
workers that trading securities on the basis of customer
information would violate the federal securities laws and
subject offenders to criminal prosecution. And to his
knowledge, no other financial service sector at the time,
including investment banks and law firms, went to the
same lengths to warn their employees about insider
trading. In Fiske's view, criminal prosecution was
warranted because Chiarella had used customer
information to purchase
acquisition-target stock
notwithstanding "overwhelmingly powerful notice" of the
consequences.37 Siffert likewise recalls contemporaneous
discussions in which Fiske emphasized to him the
perniciousness of the printing industry's insider-trading
problem as well as the incremental steps taken by the
SEC and the industry itself prior to Chiarella's
indictment. 38
A pause here is useful for counterfactual
speculation. As the U.S. Attorney, Fiske allowed higherlevel review of preliminary indictment decisions if so
requested by defense counsel, including his own review
as a final appeal.3 9 But Stanley Arkin, the attorney who
represented Chiarella during the criminal trial and
through his successful petition to the Supreme Court,
See ROBERT B. FISKE JR.,
COUNSELOR: A MEMOIR 80 (2014).

35

PROSECUTOR,

DEFENDER,

Fiske telephone interview, supranote 34.
37 Id.
38 Siffert interview, supra note 33.
39 FISKE, supra note 35, at 80.
36

[16]
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was not involved in the case at the preliminary stage.
Had the timing been otherwise, Arkin believes that he
would have been able to mount a persuasive case against
an indictment. 40 Now a legend in the white-collar defense
bar known for his tenacity, Arkin at the time was
building a premier small law firm practice, which he has
maintained for more than fifty years, except for a fouryear stint in the early 1990s as a partner at the firm of
Chadbourne & Parke. 4 1
While criminal liability for insider trading would

be a powerful deterrent, the government's decision to
press forward in a contested proceeding risked
establishing an adverse precedent that could apply in
civil insider trading cases as well. Because Chiarella had
no pre-existing relationship with the acquisition targets

or their shareholders, the criminal prosecution had to be
built on untilled soil. From a securities-law development
perspective, fewer risks would have been posed with an
inaugural criminal insider trading action against a
traditional insider of the issuing corporation rather than
an "outsider" like Chiarella. A criminal prosecution of
that type would have been a natural follow-up to SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur,42 the landmark Second Circuit
decision from a decade earlier that held directors,
officers, and employees of a mining company liable under
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 for their purchases of stock
in the company based on material nonpublic information
concerning a valuable ore strike. 43 To be sure, the en banc
opinion included a statement that "anyone in possession
of material inside information must either disclose it to
Interview with Stanley S. Arkin, founding member of Arkin
Solbakken (Oct. 30, 2019).
41 See Peter Truell, Riding Shotgun for Wall Street; Combative
40

Lawyer for Aggressive Brokers is in Demand, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.

18, 1998 at D1.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 979 (1969).
43 Id. at 847-48.
42

[17]
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the investing public. . .or.

.

.must abstain from trading in

or recommending [such] securities." 44 But that broad
statement was technically dictum and was never the
basis of a post-TGS court holding. 45 The risk of an
unfavorable precedent also could have been reduced by
initiating Rule lOb-5 "outsider trading" charges in a
litigated SEC enforcement action, rather than in a
criminal action with the defendant's imprisonment as a
possible outcome. That is, building upon the discussion of
"improperly obtained" informational asymmetries in
Commissioner Richard Smith's In re Investors
Management Co. concurrence, 46 the SEC could have
urged courts to recognize a Rule lOb-5 duty owed to all
securities issuers "not to steal or knowingly receive stolen
goods or exercise dominion over goods known to be owned
by others . . . even without the presence of a special

[insider] relationship." 47
3. The Motion to Dismiss and the Jury Trial
In addition to a defendant who had been warned
repeatedly about the possible criminal repercussions of
insider trading, the prosecutors in Chiarellahad what is
often difficult to obtain in an insider trading case:
tangible (as opposed to circumstantial) evidence that
securities were purchased on the basis of material
Id. at 848.
45 See Donald C. Langevoort, From Texas Gulf Sulphur to
Chiarella:A Tale of Two Duties, 71 S.M.U. L. REV. 835, 843,
841 (2018) (concluding that in the decade following TGS, Rule
10b-5's duty to disclose or abstain "was clearly becoming
status-based, not possession-based," but acknowledging the
44

concurrences in SEC v. Great American Industries, Inc., 407

F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968) and the "smatterings of [other] evidence
that market egalitarianism was a serious judicial philosophy").
46 In re Inv'rs Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 650 (1971)
(Smith,
Comm'r, concurring in the result).

47 Id. at 650 n.2.

[18]
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nonpublic information. Specifically, Chiarella signed a
statement on his application to the NY Department of
Labor for unemployment benefits admitting that he was
discharged from Pandick "for misusing confidential
information and that 'the allegation is true."' 48
The strength of the government's evidence,
however, did not deter Arkin from seeking SDNY District
Judge Richard Owen's dismissal of the indictment on the
ground that it failed to state a criminal offense, or
alternatively, for an order dismissing the indictment "in
the interest of justice." 49 Arkin's principal argument was
that Chiarella's "actions did not constitute even a civil
violation of § 10(b)-and Rule lOb-5-much less a
criminal violation" because Chiarella "was not in a
fiduciary relationship as to anyone so that he had no duty
of disclosure prior to purchasing shares in the target
corporation."5 0 But in the end of March 1978, Judge Owen
ruled otherwise, concluding that the government had
adequately stated a claim for two separate but related
frauds in connection with Chiarella's stock purchases.
First, Chiarella was charged with committing a "fraud
upon

the

acquiring

corporations

whose

plans

and

Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1372 (quoting statement, and
ultimately ruling on appeal that any state-created privilege
48

pertaining to statements made in applying for unemployment

benefits was not controlling in a federal criminal proceeding).
49 United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95, 95-96 (S.D.N.Y
1978).
50 Id. at 96. Arkin continued to emphasize this fiduciaryfocused interpretation of Rule 10b-5's insider trading
prohibition at every stage of the litigation. See, e.g., Brief for
the Petitioner at 21-22, Chiarella v. United States, filed June
28, 1979 (describing the "essence of the common law rule [for]
a tort action for fraud by silence [as lying] where one party to
a business transaction fails to disclose facts material to the
transaction that the other party is entitled to know because of
a fiduciary or other special relation of trust and confidence
between them") (citing cases and ALI Restatement of the Law
2d, Torts § 551(2)(a)).

[19]
14

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 15 1AUTUMN 2020 1 ISSUE 1

information [Chiarella] took while he was setting them in
type."5 1 Judge Owen noted here that "the analogy of
embezzlement by a bank employee immediately springs
to mind, and, of course, embezzlement implies fraudulent
conduct." 52 In addition, Judge Owen held that, if proven,
"Chiarella's failure to disclose his purloined information
to the sellers whose stock he purchased constituted an
'inherent unfairness' and a 'deceptive device" in
connection with his purchases." 53
Chiarella's week-long trial commenced in April
1978. AUSA Siffert introduced into evidence the
workplace signs as well as the warning notices in union
newsletters and on Chiarella's time-clock punch-cards.
Siffert also called nine witnesses for the government,
including an investigator in the SEC's New York
and former
Regional
Office,
Carmine Asselta,
shareholders in the target companies' stock who testified
that they were unaware of the impending takeover at the
time of their sales and would not have sold had the
information been disclosed to them. Because the SEC's
civil case against Chiarella was settled at the complaint
stage, it was Siffert and Asselta who gathered almost all
of the prosecution's evidence, and Asselta also prepared
the stock price charts for the jury that highlighted
Chiarella's substantial trading gains. 54 In defending
against the securities fraud charges, Arkin offered
Chiarella's direct testimony and sought to convince the
jury that while Chiarella was aware that his use of
customer information violated company rules, "he did not
believe that his actions were unlawful." 55 Among other
justifications for his conduct, Arkin maintained that
Chiarella was "well aware that it was the common
51 Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. at 97.
52 Id. at 96.
53 Id. at 97 (quoting In re Cady Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907, 912
(1961) and the text of Exchange Act § 10(b)).
54 Telephone interview of John S. Siffert, supra note 33.
55 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 50, at 7.
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practice of prospective tender offerors to purchase shares
on the open market prior to the announcement of their
tender offer plans." 56 As Chiarella stated it in his
testimony: "I was doing the same thing that they were
doing and I had no intention of doing anything wrong
with that." 57 Chiarella also repeatedly denied having
read any of Pandick Press's multiple notices with explicit
warnings of the criminal consequences, notwithstanding
his acknowledgment on cross-examination by Siffert that
he would have passed the workplace signs when he
clocked in and out more than 640 times. 58 The charges to
the jury centered on Chiarella's nondisclosures to the
sellers of the targets' stock. Although Siffert had
requested a separate charge that Chiarella had also
defrauded the offering companies, Judge Owen rejected
the request, apparently siding with Arkin's position that
any reference "to an alleged fraud on the offering
company

would be

inappropriate

as

a substantial

variance from what the grand jury allowed." 59
A jury convicted Chiarella of all 17 counts of
securities fraud under Rule lOb-5.60 A month later, Judge
Owen sentenced him to concurrent terms of one year on
most of the counts, which were suspended following one
month of imprisonment and a probationary term of five
years. 6 1 At the sentencing hearing, Judge Owen found
that Chiarella's testimony that he had not read the
workplace notices "was perjury beyond a reasonable
doubt." 62 One can speculate as to whether the jury would
56

Id. at 8.

57 Id. (quoting trial transcript at R. 492).
58 Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1369.
59 See Transcript of Chiarella Charging Conference, April 1978,
available at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/197
0/1978_1231_ChiarellaChargingConfSDNY.pdf.
60 See US Convicts Printer for Securities Fraud, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 1978 at 57.
61 See ChiarellaGovernment Brief, supra note 9, at 4.
62 Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1369-70 n. 18.
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have convicted Chiarella had he acknowledged reading
the workplace notices and admitted to disregarding
them-perhaps viewing the warnings as a scare tactic by

an employer that sought to encourage compliance with
workplace rules. On the other hand, Siffert extracted on
cross-examination two other key statements that could
have convinced a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that
Chiarella acted both knowingly and willfully: when
Siffert asked if he knew it was against the law to trade
on insider information Chiarella said "I didn't know it
was a criminal law.

. .

. It was a violation as far as I

knew;" and Chiarella admitted that he knew use of
insider information "was against the SEC."63
4. The Second Circuit's Ruling on Appeal
The
Second
Circuit's
decision
upholding
Chiarella's conviction is often depicted as an "equal
access to information" approach to Rule lOb-5 insider
trading liability. 64 It is an approach that is difficult to
reconcile with the doctrine of common law fraud, which
loosely governs judicial interpretations of Rule lOb-5. 65
Under the common law, in the absence of a duty to
disclose, a person's mere silence about material facts in a
business transaction does not constitute a fraud. In other
words, the principle of caveat emptor generally applies to
securities trading.

63 See ChiarellaGovernment Brief, supra note 9, at 11 (quoting

Trial Transcript at 515-16).
64 See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (quoting
Justice Powell's statements in Chiarella).
65 See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 253 (1988)
(White,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing that

"[i]n general, the case law developed in this Court with respect
to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has been based on doctrines with
which we, as judges, are familiar: common-law doctrines of
fraud and deceit").
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But a close reading of the Second Circuit's
November 1978 opinion shows that the appellate court
did not affirm Chiarella's Rule IOb-5 conviction based on
the breach of a generalized disclosure duty arising from
a securities trader's mere possession of material
nonpublic information. Instead, the Second Circuit held
more narrowly that "[a]nyone-corporate insider or notwho regularly receives material nonpublic information
may not use that information to trade in securities
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose." 66 And
the Second Circuit explicitly stated that it was "not to be
understood as holding that no one may trade on
nonpublic market information without incurring a duty
to disclose." 67 As Professor Donald Langevoort has
recently emphasized, the Second Circuit's approach in
Chiarella was "status-based" and constituted "an effort
to prevent abuse-wrongfully exploiting the status of
regular access to information by knowing that the
information was not theirs for the taking." 68
B. Lawyer Advocacy:

Framing the Issues

1. Chiarella's Petition for Certiorari and the
Government's Opposition
After unsuccessful motions for a Second Circuit
rehearing or a rehearing en banc, Arkin filed Chiarella's
petition for certiorari in early February 1979.69 The first
and principal question presented to the Court was:
66
67

Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1365 (emphasis added).

Id. at 1366 (emphasis added).

68 Langevoort, supranote 45, at 846.
69 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Chiarella v. United States,
No. 78-1202 (filed Feb. 2, 1979), available at http://www.sechis
torical. org/collection/papers/1970/ 1979_0202_Chiarella_Cert_
PetitionSupCt.pdf. Arkin's law partner, Mark S. Arisohn, was

co-counsel on the certiorari petition, see id., and the Supreme
Court litigation, with Arthur T. Cambouris's assistance on the
Merits Brief. Supra note 50.
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Does the purchaser of stock in the open
market who fails to disclose material,
nonpublic information about the issuer of
the stock violate Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5
where the purchaser has no fiduciary
relationship with the issuer and where the
information was obtained from and created
by a source wholly outside and unrelated
to the issuer? 70
The petition also presented a question concerning the
constitutional due process implications of the "Second
Circuit's retroactive application of its new and expansive
interpretation" of the statutory prohibitions. In addition,
Chiarella appealed on issues related to the trial court's
jury instruction on the requisite intent for criminal

securities fraud and its ruling admitting into evidence
Chiarella's signed statement from his NY State
application for unemployment benefits.71
The Solicitor General's Office filed its brief in
opposition at the end of March 1979.72 Given that the
government was opposing a petition from the first person

ever sentenced to prison for a Rule lOb-5 insider trading
violation, its opposition brief was surprisingly concise.

The brief's argument section ran just over seven pages (in
contrast to Stanley Arkin's twenty pages of client
advocacy). It is likewise surprising that the Second
Circuit's "regularly receives" limitation appeared
70
7

1

Id. at 2.

Id.

72 Brief for the United States in Opposition to Certiorari,
Chiarella v. United States, No. 78-1202 (Mar. 29. 1979) (filed
by Solicitor General Wade McCree, Assistant Attorney General
Philip Heymann, and DOJ Attorneys Sidney Glazer and Sara
Criscitelli), available at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection
/papers/1970/1979_0329_Chiarella_OppCertSupCt.pdf

[24]
19

CHIARELLA V. UNITED STATES
15 TENN. J.L. & POL'Y 6 (2020)

nowhere in the government's brief. Instead, the brief
advanced the broad dictum from the Second Circuit's
1971 Texas Gulf Sulphur decision, which observed that
"Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have long been interpreted
to protect 'the justifiable expectation of the securities
marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal
exchanges have relatively equal access to material
information."' 7 3 Had the government's opposition brief
tracked more closely the Second Circuit's actual holding
in Chiarella, which effectively imposed a disclosure duty
only on securities market participants and their agents,
it is possible that the case would not have garnered the
four votes necessary for the Court's grant of certiorari.
2. The Solicitor General's
Theory Arguments

Misappropriation

Once the Supreme Court granted Chiarella's
petition for certiorari in May 1979,74 both the intensity

and the substance of the government's advocacy changed.
This transformation can be attributed to the then-Deputy
Solicitor General Frank Easterbrook, who described his
"portfolio [as] essentially all miscellaneous civil litigation
that included antitrust and securities." 75 As Judge
Easterbrook remembers it, his reaction to the
government's equal access argument was that it did not
make sense:
What? Huh? How can that possibly be
right? .

that

.

. I mean if you didn't have a rule

people

could

trade

on

different

73 Id. at 5 (quoting Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 847-48).

74 Chiarella v. United States, 441 U.S. 942 (cert. granted, May
14, 1979).
75 Dr. Kenneth Durr, Oral History The Honorable Frank
Easterbrook at 5, SEC HISTORICAL SOCIETY (Jan.13, 2011),
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/oral-histories/20110113
_EasterbrookFrankT.pdf.

[25]
20

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 15 1AUTUMN 2020 1 ISSUE 1

amounts of information, there's no
incentive to collect the information. If
there's no incentive to collect the
information, markets won't be efficient. So
I looked at that, and I said, "This can't
possibly be right," and handed the papers
off to Steve Shapiro who was then an
assistant and who was going to succeed me
as the economic deputy in a few months. 76
Easterbrook also vividly recalls his office's
strategy for proceeding with the case. Notwithstanding
its refusal to defend Chiarella's conviction on any type of
equal access grounds, Easterbrook felt strongly that an
argument based on property rights could be successful:
[W]e were willing to defend the conviction
on a different argument,... which was that
information about what transactions you
were going to engage in, in securities
markets,
is
property.
Everybody

understands that copyrights and patents
and other trade secrets and trademarks
and so on are species of property. Well,
there's absolutely no reason why a bidder
in a case like this couldn't have property
rights in information...
So

Steve

and

I proposed

[an

argument based on] a misappropriation of
property rights. . . . And all you need was

fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities. There was the necessary
connection,

. .

. This was fraud, and that

could be the basis of a conviction...
So there we were. We took that as
the line, and the case was briefed during
76

Id. at 13.
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the period just as I was about to go out the
door and hand the case over to Steve. But
Steve and I worked on the brief together,
and I then vamoosed. I think Steve argued
the case himself when the time came. . . .77
More recently, in a tribute to Stephen Shapiro's
legacy, Easterbrook described the Chiarella briefs
misappropriation approach as playing "the long game." 78

And indeed it was a long game, as the Court waited more
than 17 years to rule on the validity of an insider trading
theory rooted in a defendant's misappropriation of
property:

But [the Court] never came to a conclusion
.

on [the misappropriation theory] because
. . [the Court] didn't think it had been

preserved.... So nothing could happen on
that because Steve and I had made it up,
no getting around that, sorry. 79

To
be
sure,
the
government
briefs
misappropriation approach tracked one of the Rule lOb5 liability theories advanced by Judge Owen, when he
denied Chiarella's motion to dismiss the indictment,8 0 as
well as the "stolen goods" analogy suggested in
Commissioner
Smith's
Investment
Management

771d. at 14-16.
78 Kathy Agonis, Steve Shapiro's Legacy in the Courtroom and
Beyond, THE CIRCUIT RIDER at 5 (Nov. 2018) (discussing Judge
Easterbrook's recollections regarding the merit briefs and oral
argument in Chiarella).
79 Oral History The Honorable FrankEasterbrook,supranote
75, at 16; see infra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing

the Court's 1997 decision in United States v. O'Hagan).
80 See supra note 51 and accompanying text (quoting Judge

Owen's holding that the indictment stated a claim that
Chiarella defrauded "the acquiring corporations whose plans
and information he took while he was setting them in type").
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concurrence. 8 1 But Judge Easterbrook can rightly lay
claim to the development of a property-rights rationale
that justifies reading Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to
prohibit the use of misappropriated information in
securities transactions. 82 Although several securities law
scholars continue to advance the Easterbrook view that
property-rights protection offers the most convincing

policy justification for a federal insider trading
prohibition,83 others (including myself) bolster our
readings of the statutory text with policy arguments
instead directed at fostering market integrity and
promoting investor confidence in the securities
markets. 84
The arguments in the Solicitor General's brief in
Chiarella ultimately resulted from a collaborative effort.
The SEC's Principal Associate General Counsel Paul
Gonson worked closely with Shapiro and Deputy Solicitor

81

See supra note

47 and accompanying

text. Prior to

Investment Management, courts in insider-trading claims
brought under state law had also begun to recognize a
corporation's property interest in its own material nonpublic
information. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494,

498 (1969) (holding that "a corporate fiduciary, who is
entrusted with potentially valuable information, may not
appropriate that asset for his own use even though, in so doing,
he causes no injury to the corporation").
82 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents,
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information,
1981 S. CT. REV. (1981).
83 See,
e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING:
ECONOMICS,

POLITICS,

AND

POLICY

(1991);

Stephen

M.

Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the
Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH.& LEE L. REV.
1189 (1995).
84

See Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory

of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O'Hagan Suggestion, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1264-70 (1998) (discussing the competing
rationales for the federal insider-trading prohibition).
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General Kenneth Geller to develop an initial draft. 85
Shapiro also sought input from AUSA John Siffert and
included him with the SG's attorneys on the brief.
Shapiro, who subsequently founded and led the Mayer
Brown

law

firm's

appellate

practice

group,

is

remembered as a brilliant and inspirational attorney,
whose generosity of spirit ensured a place for Gonson and
Siffert at the government's counsel table at the Supreme
Court oral argument. 86
Due in large part to Shapiro's ingenuity, the

government's brief advanced two distinct versions of a
Rule lOb-5 misappropriation theory. That is, the
government argued that Chiarella had "committed fraud
against both the acquiring corporations whose
information he converted and the investors who sold him
securities in ignorance of forthcoming market events of
critical importance." 87 Specifically, the government
contended that Chiarella's "secret conversion of
confidential information operated as a fraud on the
corporation that entrusted him with that information" 88
and also that his "purchases of securities based on
material
nonpublic
information
obtained
by
misappropriation constituted fraud on the sellers of those
securities." 89 The support for this second argument,
which grounded the Rule lOb-5 disclosure duty in
wrongfully obtained informational asymmetries, was
drawn from the common law, and in particular from the
English case of Phillips v. Homfray.9 0 That 1871 English
decision discarded the caveat emptor principle when the
85 Telephone Interview with Paul Gonson, SEC Solicitor 19791999 (Aug.19, 2019).
86 Telephone interview with Siffert, supra note 33; Telephone
interview with Gonson, supra note 85.
87 ChiarellaGovernment Brief, supra note 9, at 24 (emphasis

added).
88
Id. at 28.
89 Id. at 38-39.
90 6 Ch. App. 770 (Eng. 1871).
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purchaser in a real estate transaction had obtained his
informational advantage through an unlawful trespass
on the seller's land.9 1 The government's brief also
provided an economic basis for the recognition of a
common law disclosure duty in instances involving
wrongfully acquired information. 92
The Second Circuit's "regular access" approach to
insider trading liability was thus essentially orphaned at
this critical stage of the Chiarellalitigation. 93 Indeed, the
government's brief expressly sided with the Securities
Industry Association's amicus curiae concern that a
liability focus on persons who regularly receive material
nonpublic information might be misconstrued to suggest
that

"mere possession

. .

.of confidential

market

information precludes market professionals (such as
market makers, specialists, arbitrageurs, and block
traders) from carrying on their normal business
activities." 94 And that government-SIA alliance left the
Court without an advocate
"pointing out the
consequences of [a] 'fiduciary duty only' test" and pushing
for an alternative theory of liability based on one's
structural access to material, nonpublic information. 95

91 Chiarella Government Brief, supra note 9, at 41 (citing
Phillips v. Homfray, 6 Ch. App. 770 (Eng. 1871)).
92 Id. at 42 (citing Anthony Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,
Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 9
(1978)).
93 See Langevoort, supra note 45, at 847 (observing that the
government "essentially bet all the marbles on treating
Chiarella's behavior as a misappropriation, and hence a
fraud").

94 Chiarella Government Brief , supra note 9, at 70-71 n. 48
(discussing Brief Amicus Curiae of the Securities Industry
Association, Chiarella v. United States, filed June 29, 1979).

95 Langevoort, supranote 45, at 847.
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3. Chiarella's Reply Brief
In his client's reply brief, Stanley Arkin called out
the government for adopting "a new theory" that
effectively "abandoned" the "regular access to market
information" basis on which the Second Circuit affirmed
Chiarella's conviction. 96 And in Arkin's view, that Second
Circuit "regular access" approach was itself an implicit
rejection of what he contended was the district court's
reasoning that "Chiarella was under the same duty as a
classic 'insider' to disclose material, nonpublic
information to selling stockholders." 97 After setting out
arguments addressed to the merits of each of the
government's misappropriation theories (namely, the

fraud-on-the-source theory lacked the requite "in
connection with" nexus to a securities transaction, and
the
fraud-on-investors
theory
lacked
adequate
precedent), 98 the reply brief argued that the
government's proposed new interpretation of Rule lOb-5
'cannot be employed to uphold these convictions,'
because the jury that convicted Chiarella was never
charged that it must find facts now essential." 99
Specifically, the reply contended that "there was no
charge about a failure to disclose to the offeror
corporation (the non-disclosure charge given had to do
with the selling shareholders); nor was there a charge
requiring a finding that Chiarella tortiously acquired his
information."10 0

96 Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2 (filed Oct. 31, 1979), Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1-9.
99 Id. at 10 (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 814
(1971).
100 Id. (citing trial court's jury instructions).
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4. The Oral Arguments Before the Supreme
Court
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the
Chiarella case on November 5, 1979, and Arkin and
Shapiro each made masterful presentations that were
punctuated

by

the

justices'

probing

questions.10 1

Underscoring the arguments set out in their merit briefs,
Arkin emphasized that Chiarella bore "no fiduciary
relation to [any] prospective seller" of target stock.1 0 2
Shapiro, in turn, highlighted that Chiarella's "use of
converted non-public market information to enrich
himself in the stock market without disclosure to anyone
was a deceptive device within the prohibition of the
statute and the rule." 10 3

In the course of the questioning, Chief Justice
Burger lodged hypotheticals at Arkin concerning
securities trading on the basis of misappropriated
information by court-house personnel including a judge's
secretary and a court's bailiff.10 4 It is likely that Burger
had in mind a "leaking" scandal in the Court's own print
shop just seven months prior, involving a typesetter who

was reportedly fired for sharing with a journalist
"premature word of court decisions."10 5
Oral Argument, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980) (No. 78-1202), Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1979/78
101

-1202 (hereinafter ChiarellaOral Argument).

Id. at 00:01:00-15.
at 00:33:17-30.
1 04
Id. at 00:16:05-12.
105 Richard Carelli, Burger Fires Printing Aide After News
Leak, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1979 at A4 (referencing "a stormy
102

103 Id.

confrontation in Burger's chambers, during which Burger

accused the employee of 'leaking' information" to [an] ABC
correspondent"). Notably, in his Chiarelladissent, the Chief
Justice contended that "Congress cannot have intended one
standard of fair dealing for 'white collar' insiders and another
for the 'blue collar' level." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 241 (1980) (Burger, C.J. dissenting). As reflected in

[32]
27

CHIARELLA V. UNITED STATES
15 TENN. J.L. & POL'Y 6 (2020)

The oral argument also gave Justice Powell the
opportunity to foreshadow his subsequent tipper/tippee

liability ruling in Dirks v. SEC.106 Powell asked Shapiro
about the Rule lOb-5 liability consequences for an
investment analyst who advises his client to buy an
issuer's securities after having paid "a visit to a
corporation [to] obtain[] more current estimates for the
year than are available generally."10 7 That securitiesanalysts colloquy continued for several minutes with
Justice Rehnquist interjecting questions as well. Justice
Powell emphatically rejected Shapiro's suggestion that
investment research fits within a conventional
tipper/tippee

paradigm,

observing

that

"corporate

executives .. .talk about [their] company all the time" and
that "[t]he country is full of analysts and investment
advisers who try to understand what is going on in
corporations."10 8

C. The Chiarella Decision and Its Aftermath
1. The Supreme Court's Opinion
At this point the Chiarella story becomes familiar
again, although several new observations are warranted.
In place of what Justice Powell categorized as the Second
correspondence with one of his law clerks, Justice Harry
Blackmun was "not sure [he] like[d] the blue-collar/white collar
comment" in Burger's dissent and "suspected this comes rather
close to [the Chiefs] justified annoyance at the several leaks
that have taken place with respect to the Court's work on
several occasions.

.

.". See Memorandum from Justice Harry

Blackmun to Mark Rahdert re: Chiarella v. United States (Feb.
4, 1980), available at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/pa
pers/1980/1980_0204_BlackmunDecision.pdf.
106 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
107 Chiarella Oral Argument supra note 101, at 00:44:23-40.
108
Id. at 00:47:12-36.
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Circuit's "equal access" approach to insider trading
liability, the Court entrenched what came to be known as
the "classical theory."10 9 As Arkin's merits brief had
urged, the majority construed insider trading liability
under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to turn on the breach
of "a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust
and confidence between parties to a transaction."1 1 0

Accordingly, Chiarella's conviction had to be vacated
because he had "no prior dealings" with the shareholders
whose stock he purchased. As the Court emphasized,
"[h]e was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, [and he
was] in fact a complete stranger who dealt with the
sellers only through impersonal market transactions.""1

Powell's approach in Chiarellawas no doubt fueled by his
own legal experience with counseling corporate officials
and his particular "distaste for the abuse of trust of
insider trading."1 1 2 But it is also clear that the fiduciary
limitation emphasized by Arkin in his brief and at oral
argument readily provided a doctrinal pathway that
allowed the Court to announce a broad prohibition of
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
Id. at 229. As Stanley Arkin had suggested in Petitioner's
Merits Brief, see supra note 50, Justice Powell's majority
opinion invoked the fiduciary-based exception in § 551(2)(a) of
the Restatement 2nd of Torts-with no reference to any of the
other four common law bases for recognizing affirmative
disclosure obligations in business transactions. See Chiarella,
109
110

445 U.S. at 228. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the

GradualDemise of FiduciaryPrinciples,94 Iowa L. Rev. 1315,
1325 (2009) (calling attention to Justice Blackmun's
observation that the fifth exception in the Restatement "would
have supported a disclosure duty 'where one party's superior
knowledge of essential facts renders a transaction without
disclosure inherently unfair"') (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting.)
111 Chiarella, 455 U.S. at 233.
112 A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the
Counterrevolutionin the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.
J. 841, 947 (2003).
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insider trading by officers, directors, and other agents of
an issuing corporation (as well as their tippees) while
allowing Chiarella to trade with impunity.1 13
The Chiarella majority also did not rule on the
validity of either of the government's misappropriation
theories because, as Arkin had urged, it concluded that
neither theory had been properly presented to the jury as
an independent basis for finding a Rule lOb-5 violation. 114
A misappropriation theory alternative,

however, was

discussed by five justices in separate concurring or
dissenting opinions, four of whom agreed with the
government that persons who unlawfully misappropriate
information owe a disclosure duty to the investors with
whom they trade.1 1 5
It was Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in
Chiarellathat most clearly elucidated a broad "fraud-oninvestors" misappropriation theory. He opined that:

113 A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law in the
Sixties: The Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and the
Triumph of Purpose over Text, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371,
402-03 (2018) (observing that Powell seized upon "traditional
notions of fiduciary duty as [a] doctrinal tool to confine the

SEC's aggressive interpretations").
114

Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229.

11 See id. at 238-39 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)
(endorsing a broad misappropriation theory, but agreeing with

the majority that misappropriation instructions had not been
presented to the jury); id. at 239-43 (Burger, CJ., dissenting)
(endorsing a broad version of the misappropriation theory and
contending that the theory was properly presented to the jury);
id. at 245-46 (Blackmun, J, joined by Marshall, J., dissenting)
(endorsing an equal access approach-citing Victor Brudney,

Insiders, Outsiders, and InformationalAdvantages under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REV. 322 (1979) but
noting that Chiarella's
trading on misappropriated
confidential information "is the most dramatic evidence that
[he] was guilty of fraud").
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As a general rule, neither party to an
arm's-length business transaction has an
obligation to disclose information to the
other unless the parties stand in some
confidential or fiduciary relation. This rule
permits a businessman to capitalize on his
experience and skill in securing and
evaluating

relevant

information;

it

provides incentive for hard work, careful
analysis, and astute forecasting. But the
policies that underlie the rule should also
limit its scope. In particular, the rule
should give way when an informational
advantage is obtained, not by superior
experience, foresight, or industry, but by
some unlawful means. 116
To support his view of the requirements at common law,
Chief Justice Burger quoted or cited many of the
Government briefs primary sources.1 1 7 Maintaining that

the district court's instructions to the jury charged
"misappropriation with sufficient

precision,"

Burger

concluded that Chiarella owed the target shareholders a
duty to disclose or to refrain from trading by virtue of the
fact that he "misappropriated-stole to put it bluntly-

valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the
utmost confidence."1 1 8 This disclosure duty would
therefore
apply
regardless
of
whether
the
misappropriator stood in a relationship of trust and
confidence with the information's source.
The fifth member of the Court inclined toward a
misappropriation approach was

Justice

John Paul

Stevens, who favored instead the government's "fraudon-the-source" theory. He maintained that "[r]espectable
arguments could be made" that Chiarella's action
116

Id. at 239-40.

117 Id.
118

Id. at 245.
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constituted a fraud on the acquiring companies that
entrusted confidential tender offer information to his
employer, and that this deception occurred "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." 119 Justice
Stevens's concurring opinion, and the favorable
statements he made during the Chiarella oral
argument, 120 thus provided support for a narrower
approach that would predicate the Rule lOb-5 fraud on a
fiduciary's secret self-serving use of information
belonging to a principal. Justice Stevens deemed the
Court wise for "leav[ing] the resolution of this issue for
another day." 12 1 That day came in 1997 when the Court
decided United States v. O'Hagan,122 a criminal insider
trading action against a law firm partner who had
purchased target-company stock based on confidential
information that he misappropriated from his firm and
its acquiring-company client. With a six justice majority,

the O'Hagan Court resoundingly endorsed a fraud-onthe-source misappropriation theory, with a fiduciary
principle at its core.

2. The SEC's Response to the ChiarellaDecision
Despite their disappointment with the Court's

decision to reverse Chiarella's conviction, SEC officials,
particularly those in the Office of the General Counsel,
found much to like in Justice Powell's majority opinion.
They were especially gratified by the Court's strong
endorsement of In re Cady Roberts, the SEC's 1961
decision in an administrative proceeding against a broker
who had purchased stock based on material nonpublic
information relayed to him by a director of the issuing
corporation. 123 They were likewise encouraged by the
19 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J. concurring).
120 ChiarellaOral Argument, supra note 101, at 00:49:15-35.
121 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J. concurring).
122 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
123 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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Court's willingness to uphold the Second Circuit's
reasoning in Texas Gulf Sulphur, at least insofar as it
applied to traditional insiders, who owe duties of trust
and confidence to the corporation's shareholders. 124 SEC
officials were also heartened with the majority's
determination to leave open the validity of both
misappropriation theories that the government had
raised in its brief. 125
Notwithstanding those bright spots in the
Chiarella opinion, SEC officials also perceived some
disquiet from the justices over the fact that neither
Congress nor the SEC had expressly prohibited insider
trading

through lawmaking or rulemaking.

Indeed,

Justice Powell included in his opinion an ominous
footnote questioning whether any broader approach to
insider trading liability would give "either criminal or
civil defendants . . .fair notice that they have engaged in

illegal activity." 126 Ralph Ferrara, the SEC's General
Counsel, determined that the timing was right to swiftly
move forward with a rulemaking solution that would
provide securities traders with helpful clarity while
strengthening the SEC's ability to react to future trading
abuses by outsider traders like Chiarella. 127
SEC Associate General Counsel Robert Pozen and
Special Counsel Donald Langevoort thereafter worked
with Ferrara to propose the Commission expressly adopt
an insider trading rule. The rule would not only build

upon the precedents in Cady Roberts, Texas Gulf
124 Telephone Interview with Donald Langevoort, Thomas
Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University
Law Center (Sept. 5, 2019).
125 Gonson telephone interview, supra note 85.
126 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 n. 20.
127 Interview with Ralph Ferrara, Partner, Proskauer Rose
LLP (Nov.18, 2019); Donna Nagy, Oral History Professor
Donald Langevoort at 25-26, SEC HISTORICAL SOCIETY (Feb.

11, 2020), http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/oral-histories
/OralHistoriesDonLangevoortT.pdf.
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Sulphur, and Chiarella, but would also incorporate the
two misappropriation theories that were outlined in
Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Burger's opinions. The
result was unofficially dubbed "Rule 10b-X," a trifurcated
rule that would prohibit securities trading while in
possession of material nonpublic information: (1) in
breach of a duty of trust and confidence that is owed to
the securities issuer or its shareholders; (2) in breach of
a duty of trust and confidence that is owed to the source
of the material nonpublic information; or (3) in breach of
a disclosure duty that is owed to traders on the other side
of a transaction because the information was obtained
through fraud, deception, or other unlawful means. 128
The proposed rule would likewise have prohibited such
persons from advising others respecting the purchase or
sale of securities.
Rule l0b-X, however, never made it past the
Commission-proposal stage. The Office of the General
Counsel proposed the rule for Commission action in early
May 1980-less than two months after the Court's
Chiarella decision. 129 But the Enforcement Division

offered its own proposal, and the Divisions of Corporation
Finance,

Investment

Management,

and

Market

Regulation jointly proposed to the Commission a third
alternative. The Commission instead determined to move
forward with a broad insider trading prohibition that
applied only in the context of material nonpublic
information pertaining to a tender offer. That
prohibition, drafted initially by the Division of
Corporation Finance and ultimately codified as Rule 14e3, had been in the works for many years,1 30 and was
published for public comment six months prior to the

128 Id.
129

Id

130 John Huber, Oral History Richard Rowe at 33-34, SEC
HISTORICAL SOCIETY (May 24, 2004), http://www.sechistorical.

org/collection/oral-histories/rowe052404Tanscript.pdf.
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Chiarelladecision. 131 Getting Rule 14e-3 to the finish line
became the SEC's top insider-trading rulemaking
priority, and several months later the Commission voted
to adopt the rule. 132 Nearly twenty years elapsed before
the SEC would again take up rulemaking in the area of
insider trading-with projects far more limited in
scope. 133
3.

The Fate

of the

Dual Misappropriation

Theories
With four justices supporting a broad fraud-oninvestors version of the misappropriation theory, and
only one justice endorsing the narrower fraud-on-thesource version, the broader approach was arguably the
one better positioned for judicial acceptance. But like
SEC rulemaking in the wake of the Chiarella decision,
the narrower approach was the one that advanced, first
in dozens of lower court civil and criminal cases
beginning with United States v. Newman, 134and then in
1997 before the Supreme Court in O'Hagan.135 The why
and the how constitutes the final part of this Chiarella
story.
The tipping and trading activity in Newman

provided the first post-Chiarellaopportunity to seek a
court ruling in a misappropriation case against outsiders

Exchange Act Release No. 34-16385, 44 Fed. Reg. 70349
(Nov. 19, 1979).
132 Adoption of Rule 14e-3, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17120,
45 Fed. Reg. 60410 (September 4, 1980).
133 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act
Release No. 43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,692 (Aug. 15, 2000) (adopting Rule 10b5l's affirmative defenses for pre-existing trading plans and Rule
10b5-2's enumeration of circumstances that qualify for the
fraud-on-the-source misappropriation theory).
134 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
135 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
131
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who did not owe duties of trust and confidence to the
issuing corporation's shareholders. Prior to the
indictment's presentation to the grand jury in February
1981, AUSA Lee Richards sought input from the SEC.136
With assistance from SEC Special Counsel Donald
Langevoort, Richards crafted an indictment that
included

explicit

misappropriation

charges

against

Jacques Courtois and Adrian Antoniu, the investment
bankers who had tipped confidential takeover related
information to several trading co-conspirators, including
James Mitchell Newman, a securities broker. 1 37 Using
Justice Stevens's concurrence in Chiarella as a guide,
Richards also took care to explicitly reference the duties
of trust and confidence that Courtois and Antoniu owed
to their respective employers, Morgan Stanley and Kuhn,
Loeb, as well as to categorize the investment bankers'
tipping and Newman's trading as a Rule lOb-5 fraud
against their firms and their firms' acquiring-company
clients.138 Chief Justice Burger's fraud-on-investors
misappropriation theory, however, "was deliberately not
pursued in Newman" principally because "[i]t was
considered too confusing to present to the jury in tandem
with the fraud on the source theory." 139 Not only was the
fraud-on-the-source theory deemed the simpler of the two
to explain, it was also favored by Richards because it
retained Chiarella's focus on fiduciary disclosure duties
and could be supported with a battery of related
precedents from mail and wire fraud prosecutions. 140

136 Telephone interview with Lee S. Richards III, co-founding
partner, Richards Kibbe & Orbe LLP (Feb. 14, 2020).
137
United States v. Courtois et al. Indictment (S 81 Cr. 53, Feb.
1981), available at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/pape
rs/1980/1981_0101_Newman_Indictment.pdf.
138

Id.

139 Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule 10b5: Chiarella'sHistory, Central Bank's Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 865, 883 (1995).
140 Richards telephone interview, supra note 136.
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After the Second Circuit upheld the indictment in its
1981 ruling (the indictment charged violations of the mail
fraud and conspiracy statutes, in addition to Rule lOb5), 141 the case proceeded to a five-week trial, and Richards
successfully obtained convictions against all of the
Newman defendants who had not previously pled
guilty. 142

To be sure, Newman's (and, years later,
misappropriation
fraud-on-the-source
O'Hagan's)
approach to Rule lOb-5 liability plugged many of the
gaping holes left open by the classical theory articulated
by Justice Powell in Chiarella. But the fraud-on-thesource theory leaves substantial gaps of its own that
would be filled with a broader misappropriation theory
recognizing disclosure duties owed to opposite-side
traders when information has been improperly obtained.
For instance, if the government in O'Hagan had set out
to play "the long game" by advancing Chief Justice
Burger's theory alongside of its fiduciary-focused fraudon-the

source

misappropriation

theory,

the

Deputy

Solicitor General's oral argument would not have
conceded Rule lOb-5's inability to reach a non-fiduciary
thief who "stole [a] lawyer's briefcase" and traded
securities on its confidential information. 143 Nor would
141 See United States v, Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 14 (2d. Cir
1981).
142 JAMES B. STEWART, THE PROSECUTORS 134-83 (1987)
(recounting the SDNY's investigation and prosecution of

"insider trading at Morgan Stanley"). The district court's postconviction rulings were affirmed on appeal, 722 F.2d 729 (2d

Cir. 1983), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. See
Newman v. United States, 464 U.S. 683 (1983) (referencing
statement from Justice Powell that he would have granted
certiorari),

143 Oral Argument at 00:03:10-20, United States v. O'Hagan,
521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-842), https://www.oyez.org/cases
/1996/96-842 (last visited Mar 3, 2020) at 00:03:10-20
(hypothetical question posed by Justice Sandra O'Connor). Cf.
SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (distinguishing
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federal courts today have to expand fiduciary principles
prevent
other
recognition
to
beyond
almost
misappropriators and their tippees from being unjustly

enriched from their knowing use of wrongfully obtained
information.1 44 Viewing contemporaneous traders as the
actual parties defrauded by a misappropriator's
deception also avoids the perception that the fraud-onthe-source theory is merely a pretext for employing the
Chiarella-rejectedequal access approach. 145
between a Rule 10b-5 insider trading claim involving active
deception such as "misrepresenting one's identity in order to
gain access to information that is otherwise off limits," from
one involving "mere theft" such as exploiting a weakness in an
electronic code to gain unauthorized access into a computer).
144

See Nagy, supra note

110, at 1340-48 (discussing the

"growing number of courts [that] simply disregard [the
Supreme Court's] fiduciary dictate when it forecloses liability
against a defendant who has traded securities based on
wrongfully acquired information").
145 See id. at 1375 (discussing scholarly criticism directed at
O'Hagan'smisappropriation theory). The government's brief in
O'Haganmade no mention of an alternative misappropriation
theory-a fact noted in Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 n. 6 (referencing the Burger approach
and observing that "[t]he Government does not propose that we
adopt a misappropriation theory of that breadth"). But "the
long game" does appear to have been in mind a decade earlier
in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), an insider
trading and tipping case prosecuted on the theory that a Wall
Street Journalreporter's misappropriation of information from
his forthcoming columns deceived and defrauded his
newspaper-employer within the meaning of Rule 10b-5. In a
footnote in its merit brief in Carpenter, the government set out
what it described as "Chief Justice Burger's legal theory" and
argued that because "the government plainly alleged and
proved" the secret fraudulent use of the information
misappropriated from the Journal, it was unnecessary "for the
indictment to explicate the legal theory that such conduct
violates the securities laws because of its effect on other
investors and the integrity of the market." Brief for the United
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Had circumstances been otherwise, the SEC may
well have championed a broader misappropriation theory
in its own civil insider trading actions. But in the initial
aftermath of Chiarella, the SEC's outsider-trading
misappropriation cases were settled rather than
litigated, as civil insider trading actions were apt to do, 146
particularly at a time when the SEC lacked statutory
authority to seek court-ordered monetary penalties. 147
The SEC did, however, concisely reference the broader
misappropriation theory in the amicus brief it filed in
support of the government in Newman. 148 It then, once
again as an amicus in the Second Circuit, set out a fullthrottled argument in Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 149 a Rule
lOb-5 private action by an investor who had unwittingly

sold target stock at the same time that Newman was
purchasing that stock based on the confidential takeover
information
that
Courtois
and
Antoniu
had
misappropriated.1 50 The SEC's amicus brief supported
the plaintiffs entitlement to damages and urged
States, Carpenter v. United States (No. 86-422) at n.40. While
the Court was unanimous in upholding the defendants'
convictions for mail and wire fraud, the Court was "evenly
divided" (4-4) on the defendants' Rule 10b-5 convictions and
simply "affirm[ed] the judgment below on those counts."
Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 52.
146 See, e.g., SEC v. Wyman, Lit. Rel. 9311, 22 SEC Docket 391
(SDNY Feb. 20, 1981) (consent order involving trading in
target stock based on information alleged to have been
misappropriated by a paralegal at the acquiring company's law

firm) (cited in Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the
Fiduciary Principle:A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 49 (1982)).
147

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.

See Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 26 n. 33, United
States v. Newman (81-1225) (filed June 29, 1981), available at
148

http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1980/1981_0629
_SE C_Amicus_Curiae_Newman.pdf.
149 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
150 Id.
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acceptance of the fraud-on-investors misappropriation
theory "left open" in Chiarella.151 But the appellate court
upheld the district court's order dismissing the case,
concluding that the selling shareholder had not been
deceived and defrauded by the defendants because, under
the majority opinion in Chiarella, "defendants owed no
duty of disclosure to plaintiff Moss." 152 Although
Congress effectively overturned that result a few years
later by amending the Exchange Act to provide
contemporaneous traders, in both classical and
misappropriation theory cases, with an express right of

action under Section 20A, 153 Moss's holding that
shareholders are not owed a disclosure duty by an
outsider trading on misappropriated information
continued to be cited with approval. 154 After the SEC's
151 Brief of the Securities Exchange Commission, Amicus
Curiae, at 1-22, Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d
Cir. 1983) (No. 83-7120) (filed April 4, 1983), available at 1983
WL 486617.
152 Moss, 719 F.2d at 16.
153 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1.
154 See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 445 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990)
(noting that "the Second Circuit correctly rejected Chief Justice
Burger's version of the misappropriation theory as contrary to

the holdings in Chiarella and Dirks") (citing Moss v. Morgan
Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 16 (2d Cir. 1983)). But see United
States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1034 (2d Cir. 1986) aff'd
by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).Without so
much as mentioning Moss's holding three years earlier, the
Second Circuit maintained that because the reporter and his
tippees breached a duty of confidentiality owed to the Wall
Street Journal, these defendants "had a corollary duty, which
they breached, under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, to abstain
from trading in securities on the basis of the misappropriated
information or to do so only upon making adequate disclosure
to those with whom they traded." Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1034
(emphasis added). Because Judge Walter Mansfield sat on both
panels and voted with the majority each time, the tension
between Moss's holding and Carpenter's recognition of a
"corollary duty" is particularly confounding.
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amicus loss in Moss, and against the backdrop of several
litigation fraud-on-the-source victories-be ginning with
SEC v. Materia (involving yet another printer-employee
misappropriation), 155 the SEC's prior allegiance to the
broader misappropriation theory soon faded away.
Because the Supreme Court has never been asked
directly to rule upon the validity of Chief Justice Burger's
misappropriation approach to insider trading liability,

the theory is technically "left open" to this day. But while
lower federal courts can still broaden their reading of the
common law in Rule lOb-5 cases to recognize disclosure
obligations in situations involving wrongfully obtained
information, the chances that an individual district judge
or appellate court panel would do so is remote. The Court
itself declined that opportunity recently in Salman v.
United States, 156 preferring instead to issue a unanimous
decision that only further entrenched its prior classical
and misappropriation approaches.

157

The best solution to this quandary would be for
lawmakers to enact an explicit insider trading
prohibition that would unmoor the offense from its
current fraud-based rubric. And Congress is already
halfway there: by a landslide vote (410-13) in December
2019, the House of Representatives passed an artfully
crafted bill that would prohibit securities trading while a
SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d. Cir. 1984).
Salman v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 420 (2016) (affirming
Rule 10b-5 conviction of a tippee who purchased securities on
the basis of information that he knew had been
misappropriated from his brother-in-law's investment bank
employer and the bank's clients).
157 See Eric C. Chaffee, The Supreme Court as Museum
Curator:Securities Regulation and the Roberts Court, 67 CAsE
W. RES. L. REV. 847, 863 (2018) (lamenting that Salman offered
the Court an "opportunity to remake federal securities
regulation in the area of insider trading, and once again the
Court chose to preserve the status quo created by existing
155
156

precedent"). See also Langevoort, supra note 45; Nagy, supra

notes 84 and 110 (favoring Chief Justice Burger's approach).
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person is aware of "wrongfully obtained" material
nonpublic information. 158 But the proposed legislation is
logjammed in the Senate-perhaps indefinitely, if past is
prologue. 159 Thus, Chiarella'sindelible impact on insider
trading law could well continue for generations to come.

Insider Trading Prohibition Act, HR 2534, 116th Cong
(introduced by Rep. Jim Himes (D -Conn.) and passed by the US
House of Representatives, December 5, 2019.
159 See id. (referred to the US Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs on December 9, 2019). HR 2534's
language builds from similar legislative efforts in the 1980s,
which were ultimately abandoned. See Nagy, supra note 110,
at 1367-68 (discussing the proposed "Insider Trading
Proscriptions Act of 1987," among other unsuccessful attempts
at legislative reform).
158
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